In this paper we inspect whether post-announcement deal spreads are adequately reflecting the risk in merger arbitrage for 910 European M&A transactions from 1999 to 2009. We find higher premiums in cross-border M&A, but no difference between post-announcement deal spreads of domestic and cross-border transactions within Europe. Although merger arbitrage in cross-border M&A performs considerably worse, deal spreads do not adequately reflect this condition. If post-announcement spreads reflect the assumed time to consummation, the probability of deal failure, and the likelihood of price amendments then merger arbitrageurs in European cross-border transactions seem to be overly optimistic.
I. Introduction
Merger arbitrageurs invest in the stocks of M&A targets after the announcement of an offer. In the beginning of each arbitrage investment the arbitrageurs buy target stock to receive the amount of the offer on the day of deal closing. If the difference between offer and stock price, i.e., the deal spread, is sufficiently high and the time until closing is sufficiently short then merger arbitrage can gain substantial returns.
Positive deal spreads exist in most M&A transactions; the target firm's stock trades slightly below the offer price to reflect the time to deal consummation, the probability of deal failure, and the likelihood of price amendments. These three characteristics are the main risk factors in merger arbitrage. As a consequence, deal spreads are an indicator for the expected risk in merger arbitrage as perceived in the capital market.
For illustration consider the following: if the average time to M&A deal consummation decreases-e.g., due to change in regulation-then the return on merger arbitrage will rise because the amount of spread is realized over a shorter period of time. This will cause arbitrageurs to adjust their expectations leading to higher demand for target stock in future bid announcements and will result in smaller deal spreads.
These smaller spreads lead to, again, lower returns on merger arbitrage causing the arbitrageurs to re-adjust their expectations downwards to somewhere between the recent and the initial level. The equilibrium will contain smaller spreads and lower returns due to lower risk in merger arbitrage. Although this scenario only illustrates the deal spreads' reaction on the expected time to deal closing, this context applies to all risk factors. In general, better conditions reduce the risk in deal consummation and should be reflected in smaller deal spreads.
In this paper we look at European deal spreads and whether they adequately reflect the risk in merger arbitrage investments regarding to the differences in the acquirer's national origin. We analyze both pre-and post-announcement target stock prices to determine potential differences between domestic and cross-border M&A in Europe.
We find significantly higher premiums offered by cross-border acquirers. As Jindra and Walkling (2004) find a positive relationship between premiums and spreads, we expect larger spreads in cross-border M&A. Even more, we expect higher arbitrage risk in cross-border transactions due to transaction costs, information asymmetries, and agency conflicts that might prevent rapid consummation of the deal. As a result, this should lead to bigger deal spreads in cross-border transactions and lower arbitrage returns. Although premiums offered by foreign bidders are considerably higher in our sample, the deal spreads of domestic and cross-border M&A are not significantly different. However, the post-offer deal characteristics differ significantly.
We use merger arbitrage investment portfolios as a measure for post-announcement deal consummation. By design, every investment in these portfolios reacts on changing expectations concerning the risk factors, i.e., time, failure, price adjustments. In this paper we show that deal spreads are not adequately reflecting the inferior deal-consummation of cross-border transactions, which is documented by significantly lower arbitrage performance of cross-border portfolios. It seems that after deal announcement merger arbitrageurs are overly optimistic about the outcome of cross-border M&A offers in Europe.
Despite the fact that post-announcement stock prices include all available information regarding a transaction, few empirical studies analyze deal spreads and all of them are based on North American data. Although some studies include bidder characteristics, either they do not address the acquirer's national origin or their sample is restricted to domestic data. Limiting analysis to domestic data exclusively not only excludes large numbers of M&A, but it leaves out an important adjustment factor in the market for corporate control. Especially in the European Union the matter of cross-border M&A has been actively discussed in politics for the last decades. In his speech on the proposal for a new EU cross-border directive Frits Bolkestein, the then Internal Market Commissioner, said in 2003 that encouraging cross-border mergers was a very important aspect in facilitating the 'cooperation and restructuring' that was necessary 'to make Europe more competitive ' (see European Commission (2003) ).
One aspect commonly addressed in studies regarding to deal spreads is the profitability of merger arbitrage investments. An early empirical study on deal spreads, merger arbitrage and the incentives for arbitrageurs was written by Larcker and Lys (1987) . The authors examine US data on cash and stock mergers between 1977 and 1983 taken from SEC 13-D filings. By examining the target's stock prices, they find post-announcement excess returns with an average of 5 percent over a period of around 31 trading days. A study by Dukes et al. (1992) inspects US cash tender offers between 1971 and 1985. They find that investing in target stocks on the day of announcement produces daily returns of 0.47 percent until offer resolution.
More recent studies provide similar results; Jindra and Walkling (2004) use a cross section of 362 cash tender offers in the US from 1981 to 1995 finding substantial monthly returns of above 2 percent in excess to the market index. In their study of cash and stock mergers between 1981 and 1996, by companies covered in the CRSP index, Baker and Savasoglu (2002) address the limitations faced by arbitrageurs, which affect the risk structure of merger arbitrage and reduce the return on investment. Still, they find lower but significant excess returns. In a wide-ranging observation period from 1963 to 1998 Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) inspect 4.750 cash and share deals on the risk and return to merger arbitrage investment. They find that even after including transaction costs, positive excess returns do exist.
Apart from the return on investment, deal spreads are also of interest for their indicative capability. Jindra and Walkling (2004) find that deal spreads partially anticipate price amendments and deal duration (see also Branch and Wang (2008) for the most recent data from 1995 to 2005). Officer (2007) studies the reaction of deal spreads following changes in the merger arbitrage market itself. In his sample of mergers and tender offers between 1985 and 2004, he finds no convincing evidence for the performance based arbitrage hypothesis by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) . Officer (2007) shows that deal spreads are not correlated across contemporaneous deals. Neither 'merger arbitrage disasters' nor considerable changes in deal consummation seem to trigger pricing effects in merger arbitrage reflected by the deal spreads. Yet, Officer (2007) finds two exceptions: transactions announced shortly after large arbitrage losses show average deal spreads that are about 1 to 2 percent bigger. Although he finds only weak support for the response of deal spreads, a difference of 1 percent can be very influential as empirical spreads are rather small, e.g., Jindra and Walkling (2004) report an average spread of 1.86.
II. Data
We base our analysis on merger and acquisition announcements taken from Thomson One Banker Deals database (formerly known as SDC) between January 1999 and April 2009. All target companies had to be based in the EU15, Norway or Switzerland. We selected all bids for publicly listed target companies with a minimum market value of 10 million Euro, as measured by the average market capitalization between 60 to 10 trading days prior to announcement. Included are only announcements where the acquirer bid for more than 25 percent of all target shares, according to the blocking minority stake in German company law (e.g., see Franks and Mayer 2001) , and with an offer price on a per-share basis. We exclude all transactions without information on the tender or exchange offer period. Only announcements with a payment structure of either pure cash or pure stock are included. Payment information is individually extracted from the database text field named 'CONSID' contained in the Thomson database because numeric variables are either not existing, wrong, or they only contain the final offer-in case of price revisions during the negotiation phase. The CONSID field lists all individual bids if revisions or amendments were made after announcement of the offer. All additional stock related data is taken from Thomson Datastream, i.e., the share price, market value, trading volume, etc., and is matched to the transaction data by either ISIN, SEDOL, or manually by company name and country. We checked un-plausible entries regarding the bid-to-share-price ratio in historic newspaper articles taken from LexisNexis and corrected them manually if appropriate. Because some transactions with extreme bid premiums and/or deal spreads could not be falsified due to missing newspaper information we cut off the upper and lower 2.5 percentiles of all transactions with regard to the difference between share price and offer price in the interval between -5 and 10 trading days around announcement. We also checked all offer price revisions that were indicated by Thomson One Banker for their corresponding revision dates by reviewing historical newspaper articles in the LexisNexis database. Our final sample contains a total of 910 offer announcements. Table 1 shows selected descriptive statistics of our sample of European M&A announcements. Panel A contains the distribution of transaction types per year. We differentiate between transaction types in relation to the target management's attitude towards the bidder's offer, the bidder competition, the bid amendments, the realized deal outcome, and the method of payment. Panel A also shows that the 910 M&A announcements are distributed unequally over the ten year observation period. The Following Jindra and Walkling (2004) we measure the bid premium by the difference between the pronounced offer price and the average stock price between -30 and -10 trading days prior to announcement. The mean and median bid premium in cash offers are 22.2 and 20.5 percent, respectively. Share offers show distinctively lower premiums with a mean and median of 18.4 and 17.3 percent, respectively. The opposite is true when looking on the deal spreads as measured by the difference between offer price and closing stock price on the day after announcement. Cash deals have smaller spreads with a mean and median of 1.67 and 1.21 percent whereas share deals show an average spread of 4.54 and a median of 3.92 percent, respectively. On the one hand, the bigger spreads for share payment can be a sign for liquidity preference by the merger arbitrageur. On the other hand, this pattern fits to the findings of Rappaport and Sirower (1999) that show that the confidence of the acquirer's management concerning the deal is reflected in the method of payment; confident acquirers tend to pay cash. Both arguments support an encouraging impact on the arbitrageur's assessment of the time to consummation and the probability of deal failure. Surprisingly, more than 27 percent of all spreads are negative, i.e., the stock price trades above the offer after announcement. Similar to the findings of Jindra and Walkling (2004) who analyze all-cash offers between 1981 and 1995 in the United
States. Panel B also shows the return of the price run-up on the target's stock price in the period between 20 trading days until one day prior to announcement. Walkling (1985) shows that offer success is negatively affected by the target management's attitude. Jindra and Walkling (2004) explicitly study merger spreads and find that target management's hostility lowers the deal spread significantly.
Toeholds:
In their study of 362 pure cash tender offers, Jindra and Walkling (2004) also examine whether toeholds have an impact on deal spreads, but they do not find convincing evidence. Still, toeholds might be a practical way especially for foreign acquirers to gain bargaining power (see Betton et al. 2009 for twofold effects of toehold acquisitions), which is why we include this control variable. Our variable marks all bids where the Thomson database reports a share of target stock below 10 percent already owned by the acquirer prior to announcement. Unfortunately, this information seems to be rather incomplete and should be interpreted very carefully.
Rumors: Stock price movements can be triggered by rumors about future acquisitions, see, e.g., Jarrel and Poulsen (1989) , and Pound and Zeckhauser (1990) . Rumors can lead to higher demand for target stock and end in a run-up as rumored information materializes, which in turn results in lower premiums (see Jarrel and Poulsen (1989) ). To the contrary, Jindra and Walkling (2004) Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) and Harford (2005) ). Certain mergers even have contagious effects resulting in consolidating acquisition phases within an industry (for contagion see Öberg and Holtström (2006) is roughly 18 percent, the median spread is smaller with about 16 percent; the smallest 25 percent of all spreads are below 6 percent and the largest 25 percent are above 28 percent. Across the period between 10 trading days before announcement date (AD-10) and 20 trading days after announcement (AD+20) we find a characteristic pattern: ten days before announcement the average spread-which de facto is the offer premium in the period prior to announcement-is similar to the premiums reported in Table 1 , which were an average of between 30 and 10 trading days prior to announcement. In Figure 1 , starting on a level of roughly 20 percent the average spread accelerates to fall to roughly 15 percent on the day before and to 3.8 percent on the day of announcement. This pre-offer run-up pattern is well documented in the literature, e.g., see Schwert (1996) for an analysis of US data.
One day after announcement the graph shows a stage of moderate negative slope;
starting with an average of 1.98 percent (DA+1) downwards to 0.62 percent on the twentieth day after announcement. Surprisingly, more than 25 percent of all transactions show negative spreads after announcement, in other words, the target companies' stock trades at a price above the offer. This graph illustrates the distribution of spreads between offer price and stock price for each trading day around announcement date (AD) based on all 910 transactions. The black solid line depicts the average spread and the grey lines show the 25, 50 and 75 percentiles of the distribution. Ten days before announcement (AD-10) the average spread-which is the offer premium in the period prior to announcement-is similar to the premiums reported in Table 1 , which were an average of between 30 and 10 trading days prior to announcement.
III. Empirical Analysis
For a systematic analysis of premiums and spreads regarding cross-border acquisition announcements, we conduct a set of multivariate regressions. We want to determine whether there is a structural difference in deal spreads between domestic and cross-border bids. As there are many factors that possibly have an impact on deal spreads, we construct a regression model that allows us to assess the differences between domestic and cross-border while controlling for various factors.
Especially after announcement, which is our main concern, the deal spread should reflect the expected risk of a transaction, i.e., an aggregated combination of the time to consummation, the probability of failure, and the likelihood of price amendments.
We expect variables that influence any of the three mentioned characteristics to induce direct impact on our model. Still, we only include variables in our model that reflect information that was available on the day after announcement. Our model is has the following form:
The dependent variable spread i in equation 1 contains the difference between the offer price and the target stock price, cb m,i are indicator variables for the three crossborder classifications, and X n,i is a matrix of n control variables. In the first set of models we use the bid premium as the dependent variable which is calculated according to Jindra and Walkling (2004) as the difference between the offer price and the average target company's stock price between 30 and 10 trading days before announcement. On the explanatory side, we start with the three cross-border indicator variables as described earlier. By design this leaves domestic bids as the base case. For our estimates we run OLS regressions with adjusted standard errors following Huber (1967) and White (1980) . Table 2 corresponds to the descriptive statistics reported in Table 1 , which reports an average deal spread of 1.67 percent in cash and 4.54 percent in share deals.
All cross-border coefficients remain roughly unchanged after the inclusion of further control variables for the full sample of 910 transactions (models 2a and 2b). While the level 1 and 2 cross-border coefficients are be robust against a change of covariates, only the level 3 cross-border coefficient slightly reacts on the inclusion of additional controls. After inclusion, the coefficient in model 2a has a smaller impact of 5.214, suggesting that other variables as well can partially explain higher premiums for cross-border transactions. We check for co-and countermovement within covariates by their correlation matrix, but none turns out to be highly correlated with our cross-border variables (all |ρ|<0.1 for all controls, figures not reported). Model 2a
shows significantly higher premiums in bids for penny stock targets and, with an even stronger impact, considerably lower premiums offered by experienced bidders, which seems to be a plausible outcome. After all, model 2a shows that even after controlling for various acquirer, target and deal specifics, and even after controlling for time and country effects, bidders from outside Europe offer the highest premium with about 5.2 percentage points above the average domestic, followed by foreign European acquirers from countries with different currency, with a premium of 3.8
percentage points above the sample mean. Concerning the premium for deals within the Euro-area, there is no significant difference between domestic and foreign acquirers from another member of the European Monetary Union.
In case of regression on the deal spread (models 1b and 2b), none of the crossborder coefficients on any level changes to be significantly different from zero. The only mentionable reaction of cross-border impact occurs in model 2b after inclusion of the control variables, where the level 3 cross-border coefficient shows a positive estimate of 1.204 and a t-value of 1.348, i.e., a significance level with an error probability of below 18 percent. Next to the cross-border variables, model 2b shows a significant pattern for hostile bids, where the spreads are about 4.6 percentage points lower than for friendly or neutral bids. With regard to an average deal spread of only about 2 percent, this means that the average target stock in hostile offers trades at a higher price than the initial offer bid, i.e., investors speculate on an increasing offer.
This is surprising as we would expect hostile bids to be significantly higher than friendly bids to help convince target shareholders to tender their shares. One possible explanation could be inaccurate measurement due to the very low fraction of hostile transactions in Europe as opposed to, e.g., the United States.
Significantly smaller deal spreads are also reflected in the negative coefficient of the competing bidder variable, which reflects the fact that rivaling bids for one target might trigger subsequent price increases.
In general, deal spreads reflect the two main components: the probability of deal failure and the presumed time until consummation. Legal aspects in terms of regulation or corporate governance can have deep impact on either one. Across
Europe there are, in the broader sense, two contrary systems of merger-related legislations, the Anglo-Saxon and the Continental European systems (see Berglöf et al. (2003) , Cernat (2004) ). Berglöf et al. (2003) give an overview on the structural differences of national takeover jurisdiction in European countries prior to the EU's harmonization attempt on takeover law in 2004. The authors put emphasis on the characteristic legal differences between continental Europe and the British Isles (mainly the UK) and its openness regarding cross-border takeovers. Likewise, Cernat (2004) contrasts the Anglo-Saxon and the Continental corporate governance model.
He states that hostile takeovers in UK play an important role as opposed to Germany, which had practically no hostile takeovers before the acquisition of Mannesmann by Vodafone. He also states that a similar 'systemic aversion to hostile takeovers' concerns other Continental European countries as well. This systemic aversion is not only confined to hostile takeovers but especially on hostile crossborder transactions, e.g., if we reconsider the takeover of Mannesmann by Vodafone in 1999 or, even more radically, the E.ON bid for Endesa in 2006. After E.ON's offer announcement, the Spanish government tried to impose several conditions on the Endesa takeover, which they eventually had to withdraw when the European commission threatened to refer the Spanish government's action to the European Court of Justice (e.g., see Kanter et al. 2006) . Finally, E.ON withdrew its offer in early 2007, which is more than one year after their initial announcement.
Although we include target nation fixed effects in our model to control for countryspecific idiosyncrasy, still, this approach is not sufficient to cover effects by characteristic groups of countries in our sample. When we split our sample in Continental Europe versus the British Isles according to the studies on corporate governance and takeover regulation, then we find surprising results. Models 3a and 4a show the regression estimates on the premiums for the two subsamples. Like in the full sample, in model 3a we find a similar pattern of cross-border premiums within Continental Europe for levels 1 and 2, and a slightly insignificant coefficient of 4.88 for acquisition bids from outside Europe-with an error probability of below 11 percent (t-value of 1.637). For the Anglo-Saxon subsample (we had to exclude the level 1 cross-border variable because there is only one observation in our sample) we find an insignificant level 2 coefficient and, again, a weakly insignificant coefficient of 5.86 on level 3 cross-border transactions with an error probability of below 11 percent (t-value of 1.613). Models 7 and 8 report the estimates for the two subsamples of the spread regressions. In the case of transactions onto the British Isles, we do not find significant coefficients for any cross-border indicator. However, in the Continental European subsample we now find a coefficient for acquisition bids from outside Europe with a highly significant value of 3.15, suggesting a 3.15 percent higher spread for those transactions as compared to the average domestic spread with roughly 2 percent. This significantly bigger spread implies a longer time span until consummation or a higher probability of deal failure for bids by acquirers from outside Europe.
Overall, our multivariate regression analysis suggests that there is no substantial difference between deal spreads of domestic and cross-border transactions. The same result from regression models containing a single cross-border variable for all levels of cross-border transactions (figures not reported). In other words, arbitrageurs assess both domestic and cross-border transactions to be similar in their aggregated merger arbitrage risk. As we only include information that was available at the time of deal announcement, we cannot differentiate between the three risk factors in our regression. Accordingly, the composition of risk factors could be different in the domestic and cross-border sample and still lead to the same deal spreads. If this is the case, we still would expect similar returns to merger arbitrage investment as we will discuss in the following section.
Profitability
Deal spreads are in a way similar to the interest of a loan. If the default risk of a loan is high then the interest needs to be higher to compensate the lender for the additional risk. A professional lender cannot control the individual risk of a specific loan but the lender can try to eliminate this unsystematic risk in a portfolio of loans by diversification. If the return of the lender's portfolio is higher than a risk-free investment the lender will continue to lend. If the return of the (risky) loan portfolio is equal to (or smaller than) the risk-free rate of return then the lender will stop lending and start investing in the risk-free investment only (the lender might even stop sooner, if there is no adequate risk premium in addition to the risk-free rate). Only rising interest rates will convince the lender to continue lending. As modern portfolio theory shows, higher portfolio risk needs to be compensated by higher returns. The same is true for merger arbitrage. In a portfolio of merger arbitrage investments, the individual risk can be partly diversified. Overall, only if deal spreads are large enough to compensate for the remaining risk then arbitrageurs will invest in target stock; and if investments in target stock decrease then target stock prices decrease and deal spreads consequently rise.
To gain insight about what follows after deal announcement, we track the target's stock price until deal closing or withdrawal, which is exactly what merger arbitrageurs do. Merger arbitrageurs buy target stock shortly after deal announcement to gain the amount of deal spread on the day of deal closing. To see how the merger arbitrage investment strategy would have performed in our sample, we construct equally weighted portfolios of the target's stocks and conduct a performance analysis based on all transactions in our sample. For every trading day, our resulting portfolios basically contain all target stocks of M&A transactions currently undergoing deal consummation until closing or withdrawal. We adjust all target stock prices for capital adjustments such as dividends or stock splits. When applicable, we take price amendments during the negotiation phase into account. Every bid in our sample becomes an investment position in the equity portfolio, and every position is invested on the day after announcement (AD+1). In case of a cash deal the investment is simply a long position in the target firm's stock, and in case of a share deal we use a long position in target's stock and a short position in acquirer's stock in the amount of the exchange ratio. Every equity position is terminated when a deal is either closed or withdrawn, or if the holding period exceeds one year (the latter is the case for 14 transactions in our sample). For every cash offer position we calculate its daily return r Tit . For stock offers we compute daily returns for the long/short positions following Baker and Savasoglu (2002): ( )
In equation 2, r it is the daily return of the combined long/short position i, r Tit is the return of target stock, r Ait is the return of acquirer stock, r ft is the risk free rate, δ is the exchange ratio and P Tit-1 and P Ait-1 are the stock prices on the day before. As the risk free rate, we use the 2 Year German Government bond. We report all figures based on the respective target nation's currency. Additionally, for a common base of measurement we convert all prices in Euro with currency exchange rates taken from Thomson Datastream. Since data is not publicly available, we ignore all transaction costs. Still, this does not bias our results as we are not interested in the mere size of portfolio returns but in their relative differences between domestic and cross-border. share-which was more than twice as high as Continental's stock price on that day (However, this superficial two-day return was not accomplishable because investors had to have already tendered their Continental shares during tendering period. The method of calculating our portfolios replicates the aggregated daily liquidation value, i.e., it reflects the total gain if all position had been terminated on that day). As we have seen in the section before, foreign offers by and large do not show different spreads. Except for Non-European acquirers of Continental European targets, there is no significant difference between foreign and domestic bidders when measured by the deal spread on the day after announcement, which means that the market assigns the same risk regarding to the outcome of cross-border transactions.
Generally, the deal spread contains all expectations on the further consummation of the deal. Bigger spreads show higher uncertainty regarding failure, duration, and price stability (see, e.g., Jindra and Walkling (2004) ). If foreign bids show identical spreads to domestic bids, the profitability of merger arbitrage investments should be the same, too. To assess the differences between domestic and cross-border portfolios, we use the standard three-factor model by Fama and French (1993) estimating the abnormal returns generated by the individual investment strategy. We use the MSCI Small Cap EMU and the MSCI Large Cap EMU indices to calculate a European Fama-French SMB factor, and for generating the HML factor we use the MSCI Growth EMU and MSCI Value EMU indices (e.g., Drobetz et al. 2004 ). Our three-factor Fama-French model has the form:
Equation 3 is assembled as follows: R Prtf is the return of the respective portfolio, r f is the risk-free rate, R M is the return of the market portfolio, SMB is the small-minus-big Table 3 reports domestic portfolios of a size equal to the cross-border portfolios, which were generated by 1000 replications in a Monte portfolios is superior to the performance of domestic portfolios. In fact, the gross returns reveal the dramatic difference between cross-border and domestic portfolios.
In the case of transactions in the Euro-area (cross-border, level 1) the gross return difference between cross-border and domestic amount to 209.7-98.0=111.7
percentage points, which is more than twice as much portfolio performance.
The actual figures of gross return roughly correspond to the estimated alphas with Moreover, cross-currency transactions within Europe (cross-border, level 2) do perform poorly, and again, this is not reflected in significantly higher spreads. In light of these figures the justification for indistinguishable deal spreads is questionable. In other words, the lacking difference between domestic and intra-European crossborder spreads is not justified by merger arbitrage performance. In the previous chapters we discussed the risk in merger arbitrage as been driven by the factors time, failure and price stability. To some extent, these risk factors also determine the investment-portfolio risk, which can be measured by the standard deviation of its returns. In Table 4 , all cross-border portfolios show much higher standard deviations in their returns than the domestic portfolio. For a more elaborate indicator, the sharpe-ratio measures the amount of excess-return per unit of risk, which is calculated by the average risk premium of a portfolio divided by its standard deviation. The domestic arbitrage portfolio has a sharpe-ratio of 0.5. This is similar to the findings in US-domestic arbitrage investment by Baker and Savasoglu (2002) who report a ratio of 0.39. The difference between their US figures and our European figures is primarily based on the risk-free rate of return, which equals to 0.1 percent in our case and 0.57 in the case of Baker and Savasoglu (2002) . However, the more striking figures are the sharpe-ratios of cross-border portfolios that document an inferior return-to-risk relationship than the domestic portfolios.
To summarize our findings, we report the qualitative results of both deal spread analysis and portfolio performance analysis in direct comparison. This reflects the same risk expectations as in domestic transactions; which is why we assign an arrow pointing to the right. Only cross-border transactions by nonEuropean acquirers in Continental Europe show significantly larger deal spreads, i.e., higher risk expectations in those transactions. We therefore assign an arrow pointing upwards.
In column 2 we contrast the results from the arbitrage portfolio analysis, which reflect the ex post realization of the deal. Most cross-border portfolios show significantly lower returns by all measures. This documents a higher degree of risk in crossborder transactions; which is why we assign arrows pointing upwards for all subsamples but for one; the latter are cross-border transactions by non-European acquirers on the British Isles. Although the arbitrage portfolio of this specific subsample shows distinctively lower gross returns, the generated alpha in the threefactor model was even larger than the alpha of the domestic portfolio. With some amount of goodwill we assign an arrow pointing to the right to indicate that the returns on merger arbitrage are similar to the domestic sample. Overall, deal spreads do not seem to adequately reflect the risk in merger arbitrage returns, i.e., the time until consummation, the probability of failure, and the likelihood of price amendments in cross-border M&A transactions.
IV. Robustness Checks

Trading days around announcement
The following section of the paper introduces some variations and checks to validate our findings. We start our robustness checks by looking at variations of the base date for the analysis, which has several reasons. Conducting our deal spread analysis on the day after announcement could limit to results. Although we carefully assembled our data, some announcement dates in our sample might not contain the actual day when the offer was made public. As indicated in other studies based on Thomson M&A data, some announcement information is incorrect and the true dates differ couple of days. And, we calculated all premiums by the difference between the offer price and the average stock price prior to announcement over a certain time interval.
Differing measurements could bias our findings. Figure 3 shows the fluctuation of cross-border coefficients in the time span between ten days prior and twenty day after announcement. Every black square indicates a single cross-border coefficient for non-European acquirers in a regression (according to the full model in Table 2 including all control variables) on the deal spread for each particular trading day around announcement date (AD). Overall, the graphs are a combination of 31 different regressions. In addition to the coefficient, the dotted black lines mark the 90 percent confidence interval of the respective coefficient. The upper graph shows the coefficients for cross-border transactions by non-European acquirers (level 3) on the British Isles and the lower half shows the level 3 coefficients for Continental Europe.
Figure 3: Daily coefficients of cross-border indicator variables
Every black square in this figure shows a single cross-border coefficient of a regression model similar to models 4 and 8 in Table 2 . Every coefficient shows the estimate of a regression on the difference between offer and stock price on a particular trading day around announcement date (AD). Next to the coefficient the dotted black lines mark the 90 percent confidence interval of the respective coefficient. In total the figure consists of 31 different regressions. The upper graph shows the various coefficients for the cross-border level 2 indicator variable and the lower half shows the coefficients on the level 3. In contrast to Table 2 , the regression on the premium, i.e., the days before AD, in the British Isles sample does not show significantly higher premiums for bids by nonEuropean acquirers, but the confidence interval documents a big variance until announcement day. It seems that target stock prices rise in the days prior to announcement, which could explain the estimation difference between Table 2 and Figure 3 . In the period after announcement, the graph confirms our previous findings.
All coefficients have values near zero, and their confidence intervals strongly support this conclusion. In the Continental European sample (lower graph), the regressions reproduce our findings from Table 2 . Before announcement, we see higher premiums around 6 percent until four days prior to the offer; starting 3 days before announcement until 3 days after the offer, the spreads successively decrease towards a level of 2 percent. A reason for this gradual decrease could be that the reported announcement dates are incorrect and the true announcement dates distribute across a couple of days around the reported date in the database. Although the post-offer levels show coefficients that are about one percent smaller than in Table 2 , they still are significantly different from zero and, with an average of 4 percent, twice as much as the domestic spread, with an average of 2.1 percent (figures taken from regression sample, not reported in table). In Figure 3 , we report cross-border coefficients on level 3 only. We additionally checked all other crossborder coefficients accordingly, which confirmed our previous results.
Impact of EU Legislature
After 14 aspects of the directive. Nonetheless, we ran a newspaper research for the effective dates when the respective national law-fully or partially compliant-was enacted.
France was the first of the EU15 member states to implement the new directive on Table 6 shows the regression results for Continental EU15 versus the British Isles.
The coefficient of the EU Directive indicator is insignificant throughout all four models, however, in the case of premiums, we find a positive coefficient of 9.365 with a t-value of 1.43, suggesting a very weak but positive impact of the new legislation on the average premiums offered for British and Irish target firms. Still, our main focus is on deal spreads, which are not significantly different after the new takeover directive.
Another way to compare the two categories of old versus new legislation is to make use of a categorical regression approach like the logistic regression model. This
regression model allows us to analyze the differences between the two legislative regimes across multiple factors. The dependent variable is dichotomous, taking the value of zero for the pre-directive, and the value of one for the post-directive era. Table 7 shows the logistic regression estimates for all cross-border variables, premiums, spreads, and selected control variables for the full sample (excluding Switzerland and Norway) in model 1, and the two subsamples Continental Europe versus British Isles in models 2 and 3. If the new directive helped to foster crossborder acquisitions, we would expect significantly positive coefficients. In Table 7 none of the cross-border coefficients turn out to be significantly different from zero. 
Cross-border premiums and price run-ups
Another aspect we want to examine is the fact that premiums are higher for crossborder acquirers in general and even highest for non-European acquirers, while spreads do not differ between groups. It might be possible that foreign transactions lack the pre-announcement stock price run-ups, which are known to have an impact on the premium and the deal spread (see Jindra and Walkling (2004) ). In an analysis of US data, Schwert (1996) shows that up to 41 trading days prior to announcement there are substantial upward movements in the target firm's stock price for US data.
Based on his findings, Schwert argues that this could possibly be due to leakage and insider trading regarding future takeovers. If this phenomenon only existed in domestic transactions then higher premiums for cross-border transactions could simply result from our estimation of premiums based on an upward-biased target stock price for domestic deals. Table 8 shows the distributions of pre-announcement stock price run-ups for our different subsamples. Following Schwert's methodology (1996) , we measure price run-ups in the period of 41 trading days until one trading day prior to announcement.
The figures clearly reflect the existence of price run-ups in cross-border transactions.
In fact, foreign run-ups, with a mean of 12.5 percent (median of 7.1 percent), are higher than in the domestic and intra-EMU sample with an average of 10.1 percent (median of 6.2 percent).
Liquidity and other portfolio aspects
Considering our sample's descriptive statistics, especially the distributions of target firm size and trading volume, our estimates might be biased towards transactions with small target companies and low trading activity, i.e., low liquidity. Although company size is heavily correlated with trading volume (a correlation coefficient of 0.746 in our sample), not only the target's size but especially the amount of free float is important and determines the degree of liquidity of a stock. Some stocks are more liquid than others, which is why we control for trading volume. To see how our estimates react when we consider the liquidity of each investment, we introduce the target stock's trading volume into our analyses. Similar to Jindra and Walkling (2004) , we use the average daily trading volume of target stock between -50 and -25 days prior to announcement. We then create weights based on the log of trading volume.
We take the log-value to avoid very large companies dominating the results. Models 1, 2 and 3 of Table 9 show the estimates of trading-volume-weighted OLS regressions according to models 2b, 3b and 4b in Table 2 . By comparing the results of the weighted regressions with the un-weighted models, we find the same patterns for all cross-border coefficients. The only coefficients that show a distinctive change are those of the method of payment. After controlling for trading volume, the postoffer spreads in share deals do not turn out to be significantly larger than in cash deals. In other words, the initial pattern of bigger spreads in share deals could be driven by transactions with smaller and, in terms of their stock, more illiquid targets.
After all, our initial findings for cross-border transactions are not biased by firm size or liquidity.
As we have seen, the cross-border deal spread patterns hold if we adjust for the liquidity of the target's stock. Lack of liquidity can dramatically reduce the propensity of merger arbitrageurs to invest in M&A targets. To see how merger arbitrage returns are influenced by the adjustment for liquidity, we accordingly use the trading-volumeweights for creation of our portfolios. Table 10 shows the returns of weighted portfolios in absolute figures and through Jensen's alpha in a Fama-French three factor model. After weighting, the returns of the domestic and all intra-European portfolios increase, while the portfolio returns of transactions by non-European acquirers are worse after the adjustment. Both the Euro based and target-currency based portfolios show the same reactions.
In terms of alpha, only the portfolios of intra-European acquirers gain substantially.
The most negative impact bears the portfolio of non-European acquirers and
Continental European transactions. It shows a smaller coefficient but, weighted and un-weighted, the estimate is not significantly different from zero. Although this analysis raises the question why the portfolio of non-European acquisitions performs so much worse after volume-weighted adjustment we do not address this question in this paper. Considering the reliability of our portfolios, we also run our analysis of the domestic portfolio after exclusion of two outlier transactions in terms of portfolio returns; the deal by Schaeffler and Continental and the transaction by Alten acquiring GroupCyber. After exclusion, the domestic portfolio in target currency gains only 465 percent (instead of 524) over the observation period and generates a significant alpha of 1.15 (table not reported). Although the difference is noticeable the domestic portfolio still gains significantly higher returns than all cross-border portfolios. Another variation in the analysis of equity portfolios we like to address is the difference between equity indices with re-investment of dividends. Our prior three-factor models use the index prices, not considering the dividend payments that were generated by the underlying equities. In contrast, we run the three-factor models based on the same indices but including all dividend payments, i.e., the total return of the index.
The regression results show very similar coefficients. For example, in the domestic portfolio the coefficient of the market premium changes from 0.013 (t-value of 0.19) to 0.009 (t-value of 0.13) and the alpha of the portfolio changes from 1.289 (t-value of 5.99) to 1.285 (t-value of 5.80).
Overall, controlling for liquidity, excluding outliers, and switching to indices with reinvested dividends does not alter our results qualitatively. The attempt of the previous robustness checks was to validate our findings of significantly lower arbitrage returns in cross-border transactions; the results show that our previous findings are robust against any variation of this kind.
Non-European acquirers and their origin
Our estimates of significantly bigger spreads in cross-border bids from outside Europe could stem from few, but intense, 'risk-surcharges' for acquirers from emerging or developing countries. In model 4 of Table 9 we split the group of cross- Bermuda, Canada, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Taiwan, and the United States of America. As we can see in model 4, the cross-border coefficient for acquirers in developed countries has about the same impact, with a coefficient of 3.432 and a t-value of 2.637, as in the regression analysis earlier in this paper. The coefficient for bidders in emerging or developing countries is distinctively smaller in size (a coefficient of 0.281) and not convincingly different from zero. The very low t-value is a sign for high variance of deal spreads in the group of emerging and developing countries. Although the average deal spread of 3.97 percent is fairly high, the standard error of the distribution amounts to 3.06. In contrast, the average spread for acquirers from developed countries is 2.39, with a standard error of 0.93. The economic intuition behind these figures could be that the deal spreads depend much more on the individual acquirer than in the case of bidders from developed countries.
Ex-post information and deal spreads
In contrast to Jindra and Walkling (2004) we excluded all variables from our regression model on deal spreads, which contain information that was not available on the day of announcement. We also excluded the deal premium as explanatory variable. To make our results more comparable, we further include these variables into our regression on the deal spread. Model 5 in Table 9 contains the regression results on the deal spread after inclusion of the offer-premium, the actual time until closing or withdrawal Duration in days, and the categorical variable Price amendments that takes the value of one for offer increases, the value of minus one for offer price reductions, and zero otherwise. Due to correlation between the transaction duration and transaction closing we did not include an indicator variable for closed deals. Still, the coefficients of duration and price amendments show the expected signs and significances: the longer the time until closing or withdrawal, the bigger the deal spread. Roughly spoken, an increase of 100 days in time until consummation is equivalent to a larger deal spread of 0.4 percentage points. In other words, the deal spreads initially were larger for deals, which ex-post show a significantly longer time until consummation. The same is true with price amendments; offers that were increased (decreased) afterwards had significantly smaller (larger) deal spreads on the day after announcement. Finally, these results emphasize our underlying assumption that deal spread reflect the risk factors of merger arbitrage investments.
V. Conclusion
In spite of the large number of financial studies concerning stock price reactions on M&A announcements, few address the impact of borders. In contrast to economic literature, which provides a vast number of papers dealing with borders, most financial models stem from analyses of domestic markets. This paper shows that there are strong differences between domestic and cross-border environments related to M&A deal consummation. We analyzed deal spreads of European M&A transactions and their consistency to the risk in merger arbitrage, i.e., the time to consummation, the probability of failure, and the likelihood of price amendments.
Due to information asymmetries, higher transaction costs, and agency conflicts, which might prevent rapid consummation of the deal, we assume cross-border transactions to bear more frictions than domestic deals. As a consequence, this should lead to larger deal spreads as they reflect the capital market's expectations on the time to consummation, the probability of failure, and the likelihood of price amendments. To compensate for this additional risk, we expect the returns of arbitrage portfolios containing cross-border transactions to be higher than domestic portfolios.
The opposite seems to be true: we find that deal spreads of domestic and crossborder M&A are not significantly different from each other. Although deal spreads do not differ, the returns on merger arbitrage in cross-border transactions are even worse than in domestic portfolios, documenting a significantly higher level of risk. We find that cross-border deal spreads are inconsistent with the return on merger arbitrage investment. However, we also find different patterns in Continental Europe and the British Isles. Only cross-border transactions by non-European acquirers in Continental Europe show significantly larger deal spreads. On average, they are 3.2 percentage points larger, which is more than twice as much as the domestic spreads. This is the only subsample in which deal spreads apparently correspond to low merger arbitrage performance. Contrary to that, Non-European acquisitions on the British Isles perform rather well-even better than cross-border transactions within the Euro-area. Our analysis provides weak but positive support that the new EU takeover regulation neither has a significant effect on deal spreads nor an effect on the amount of cross-border acquisitions. Merger arbitrage investment performance casts some doubt on the adequacy of deal spreads in European cross-border M&A. It seems that merger arbitrage investors are overly optimistic about the consummation of cross-border M&A in Europe.
